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Constitutionalism and the Foundations of 
the Security State 
Aziz Rana 
Scholars often argue that the culture of American 
constitutionalism provides an important constraint on aggressive 
national security practices. This Article challenges the conventional 
account by highlighting instead how modern constitutional reverence 
emerged in tandem with the national security state, critically 
functioning to reinforce and legitimize government power rather than 
primarily to place limits on it. This unacknowledged security origin 
of today’s constitutional climate speaks to a profound ambiguity in 
the type of public culture ultimately promoted by the Constitution. 
Scholars are clearly right to note that constitutional loyalty has 
created political space for arguments more respectful of civil rights 
and civil liberties, making the very worst excesses of the past less 
likely. At the same time, however, public discussion about protecting 
the Constitution—and a distinctively American way of life—has also 
served as a key justification for strengthening the government’s 
security infrastructure over the long run. 
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I argue that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
there existed significant popular skepticism of the basic legitimacy of 
the Constitution. Against the backdrop of World War I and the 
Russian Revolution, a combination of corporate, legal, and military 
elites initiated a concerted campaign to establish constitutional 
support as the paramount prerequisite of loyal citizenship. Crucially, 
such elites viewed the entrenchment of constitutional commitment as 
a fundamental national security imperative. They called for a 
dramatic and permanent extension of the reach of the federal 
government’s coercive apparatus. In this process, defenders of the 
Constitution endorsed many of the practices we most associate with 
extremism and wartime xenophobia: ideological uniformity, appeals 
to American exceptionalism and cultural particularity, militarism, 
and political repression. The World War I origins of today’s 
constitutional climate do not simply reveal a troubling but distant 
past. Rather, the foundations developed nearly a century ago 
continue to intertwine constitutional loyalty with the prerogatives of 
the national security state in ways that often go unnoticed, making it 
difficult to separate the liberal and illiberal dimensions of American 
constitutional culture. 
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INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACHMENT AND AMERICAN  
CIVIC CULTURE 
In contemporary American politics, perhaps no commitment enjoys as 
much widespread public support as belief in the sanctity of the federal 
Constitution. Displays of constitutional loyalty are ubiquitous, ranging from the 
establishment of Constitution Day as a national holiday1 to bipartisan readings 
from the text to usher in new sessions of Congress2 to references to its wisdom 
during presidential speeches and addresses.3 There are of course dissenting 
views, especially following the recent financial crisis and government gridlock. 
A vocal minority of scholars declares that the Constitution has generated a 
“frozen republic”4 or a “republic, lost”5 and argues for “constitutional 
disobedience”6 and even a new constitutional convention.7 But as a political 
 
 1. This occurred in 2004 against the backdrop of the Iraq War. Democratic Senator Robert 
Byrd from West Virginia spearheaded the effort and pushed through an amendment to an 
appropriations bill that made September 17, the date of the text’s 1787 Convention signing in 
Philadelphia, a special day of commemoration. See Jason Frank, Constitution Day Lecture at Cornell 
Law School (Sept. 17, 2012) (transcript on file with author). The bill mandated that every educational 
institution receiving federal funds, regardless of whether the institution was private or public, grade 
school or university level, “shall hold an educational program on the United States Constitution on 
September 17.” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 111(b), 118 Stat. 
2809, 3344 (codified at 36 U.S.C. §106 (2006)). Although Byrd was a sharp Administration critic and 
opponent of the war, the Bush White House strongly backed the holiday. In fact, for years, Bush had 
been issuing executive proclamations declaring the week of September 17 to be “Constitution Week.” 
See Proclamations Issued by President Bush, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/proclamations/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2015). For more 
on political circumstance around the 2005 bill, see Frank, supra. 
 2. This practice was started in 2011 by Republican members of the House of Representatives, 
with notable Democrats such as Nancy Pelosi participating. Mary McGuire, 66 Minutes to Read the 
U.S. Constitution, ABC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013, 1:17 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/ 
2013/01/66-minutes-to-read-the-constitution. Two years later, according to Bob Goodlatte, the 
Republican House Judiciary Chair, the desire to participate in the reading was so strong that they “ran 
out of Constitution before they ran out of readers.” Id. 
 3. As just one illustration, the very first words of President Barack Obama’s second inaugural 
address maintained that the inauguration itself should be viewed as a collective moment in which the 
country “bear[s] witness to the enduring strength of our Constitution.” Barack Obama, President of the 
U.S., Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013) (transcript available at http://articles.washington 
post.com/2013-01-21/politics/36473487_1_president-obama-vice-president-biden-free-market). 
 4. DANIEL LAZARE, THE FROZEN REPUBLIC: HOW THE CONSTITUTION IS PARALYZING 
DEMOCRACY (1996). 
 5. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011). 
 6. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 10 (2012) (arguing that 
for Americans to fulfill our national principles we must actually “first free ourselves from the yoke of 
constitutional obligation”). 
 7. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006). In republishing 
his seminal book Constitutional Faith in 2011, Levinson pointedly concluded in a new afterword that 
although he once chose to sign the Constitution as part of an exhibit celebrating the text’s 200th 
anniversary he would not do so again. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 246, 249–50 
(2d ed. 2011). He no longer believed in the document’s progressive potential, “unless one reduce[d] 
‘constitutional faith’ to a willingness to embrace the Preamble while being harshly critical of much of 
what follows it.” Id. at 245. 
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matter, these calls to ignore or fundamentally rewrite the Constitution are 
voices in the wilderness; they reside more or less exclusively in the academy 
and would be nearly unthinkable if expressed by a major electoral figure in 
public life. 
Furthermore, even in the academy, constitutional loyalty runs deep, with 
legal scholars habitually reaffirming their own commitment to the text and 
arguing that the Constitution and American nationhood are inextricably bound 
together. In the words of Akhil Amar, the Constitution is “one of the things . . . 
that we Americans have in common, one of the things that constitute us as 
Americans.”8 Laurence Tribe takes such sentiment further, contending that the 
very idea of being “American” only makes sense against the backdrop of the 
document. Tribe writes that the 1787 Constitution’s “text and invisible 
structure are part of the nation’s beating heart—the solar plexus at which the 
vast diversity of American narratives inevitably converge, and the conversation 
through which we remain tied to past and future generations. ‘We, the People’ 
cannot simply bracket our Constitution . . . for that very notion presupposes a 
‘we’ that exists outside the Constitution’s frame.”9 
Such commentary is in large part driven by the belief that the Constitution 
as a cultural force has had profound positive effects on American civic life. For 
Tribe, what makes the text so invaluable is not so much its specific structural 
features, let alone the legal opinions that judges have reached. Rather, the 
Constitution and the discursive traditions that surround it provide Americans 
with a continuous practice of “collective interpretation and reinterpretation,”10 
one that promotes not only substantive liberal commitments but also a broader 
national ethic of critical engagement. 
Tribe, Amar, and others are well aware that citizens once viewed the 
Constitution itself as compatible with various modes of illiberalism and 
coercion. But according to these authors, the constitutional tradition has, above 
all, played the role of forcing Americans to confront their own national 
demons. As Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel maintain, the Constitution provides a 
reflective mechanism for addressing the country’s historic sins and for 
reshaping American identity on grounds of universal equality and fundamental 
rights. They write, “All these changes came about because people believed in 
their Constitution and in the importance of continually examining our practices 
in light of our principles.”11 For this reason, “each generation must honor the 
 
 8. Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Populism, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1658 (1997) (continuing, “[a]nd I think it is, perhaps, a superior form of 
constituting us as Americans than the fact that we all watch Seinfeld and Friends on Thursday night”). 
 9. Laurence H. Tribe, America’s Constitutional Narrative, 141 DAEDALUS, Winter 2012, at 18, 
34. 
 10. Id. at 19. 
 11. Jack M. Balkin & Rèva B. Siegel, Introduction, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 1, 3 (Jack 
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
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Constitution’s commitments in its own time.”12 Underlining the point, Cass 
Sunstein similarly concludes that failing to do so would mean nothing less than 
abandoning precisely what is exceptional in American character: a 
constitutional culture that has over time promoted democratic consent, 
pluralism, and equal rights for all.13 
Such arguments about the salutary effects of constitutional attachment are 
particularly pronounced in debates about national security. Today, scholars and 
commentators routinely contend that the Constitution functions as a constraint 
on an aggressive security mindset, especially by checking government excess 
and discretionary authority. Once again, scholars readily admit that such 
constraint does not always (or even primarily) occur through explicit court 
oversight, given the checkered judicial history when it comes to rights 
protection. But even when more formal constitutional processes fail as 
safeguards, the Constitution, so the story goes, provides a second, far more 
important type of constraint. It promotes a common public culture committed 
to self-reflection, respectful of the rule of law, and skeptical of belligerent and 
xenophobic appeals to exclusion and violence. Geoffrey Stone writes that “the 
United States has made substantial progress” in the last century in balancing 
security with liberal values, in large part because of “the development of a 
national culture” grounded in constitutional attachment and “more attuned to 
civil liberties.”14 Richard Pildes also sees a narrative of real progress, because 
of how the pervasive climate of constitutional loyalty affects presidential 
decision making.15 According to him, the Constitution above all “serve[s] as a 
crucial focal point for widely shared judgments about presidential 
credibility.”16 Thus, even in circumstances where there is little likelihood of an 
official reprimand, the public belief that the President has violated the 
Constitution imposes extensive political sanctions.17 In effect, for scholars like 
Stone and Pildes, widespread constitutional commitment operates to place 
serious limitations on the government’s coercive apparatus. 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Real Meaning of American Exceptionalism, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Sept. 23, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-23/the-real-meaning-of 
-american-exceptionalism.html. According to Sunstein, “American exceptionalism is real. It began in 
1787, with the Constitution’s effort to establish a large, self-governing republic, in which diverse 
views serve as both a safeguard and a creative force.” Id. Quoting Alexander Hamilton’s language in 
Federalist No. 1, Sunstein declares that while European history, marked by monarchical despotism 
and class conflict, may have been the product of “accident and force,” the defining feature of the 
American experiment—expressed most profoundly by that initial act of constitutional construction—is 
instead the effort to base politics on “reflection and choice.” Id. 
 14. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 533 (2004). 
 15. Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (2012). 
 16. Id. at 1411. 
 17. See id. at 1412 (arguing that citizens and political actors “will coalesce in broad agreement 
around the point that public officials should comply with the law. Because the law has this focal-point 
significance, the allegation that the President has violated the law is often what transforms an event 
into a scandal”). 
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This Article challenges the conventional narrative that constitutional 
loyalty has unproblematically refashioned American civic life around liberal 
values, in the process generating a more inclusive and less coercive political 
community. It does so by offering an alternative account of the historical 
relationship between constitutional attachment and national security practices. I 
argue that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, significant 
popular skepticism actually existed concerning the basic legitimacy of the text, 
voiced at times even by future presidents and sitting judges.18 But against the 
backdrop of World War I and the Russian Revolution, a combination of 
corporate, legal, and military elites initiated a concerted campaign to establish 
constitutional support as the paramount prerequisite of loyal citizenship. At a 
moment of external conflict and real domestic uncertainty about what defined 
the United States as a unified community, these civic and political actors 
sought to elevate the Constitution above popular dissent. Crucially, such elites 
viewed the entrenchment of constitutional support as fundamentally a national 
security imperative; they called for dramatically and permanently extending the 
reach of the federal government’s security apparatus. In the process, defenders 
of the Constitution reproduced many of the practices we most associate with 
extremism and wartime xenophobia: ideological uniformity, appeals to 
exceptionalism and cultural particularity, militarism, and political repression. 
The unacknowledged national security origins of today’s constitutional 
reverence highlight a profound ambiguity in the type of public culture that the 
Constitution has promoted. In particular, the text and the discursive traditions it 
has spawned fuse liberal and illiberal practices in ways that are difficult to 
disentangle. Stone, Pildes, Tribe, and others are clearly right to note that 
constitutional loyalty has created political space for creedal arguments more 
respectful of civil rights and civil liberties, making the very worst excesses of 
the past less likely to manifest today. At the same time, however, public 
language about protecting the Constitution—and with it a distinctively 
American way of life—has also served as a key justification for strengthening 
the government’s security infrastructure over the long run. Moreover, the 
twentieth-century historical process by which elites generated an affective 
popular bond to the American Constitution was based just as much on 
inculcating deference from above as on fostering self-reflective citizen-
subjects—what scholars often associate with constitutional culture. In effect, 
the events surrounding World War I underscore how modern constitutional 
reverence emerged in tandem with the national security state, functioning 
critically to reinforce and legitimize government power instead of simply to 
limit it.19 The long-term implication is that our constitutional culture—rather 
 
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. In highlighting these far-less-explored features of constitutional reverence, this Article 
resonates with a set of intuitions also present in two recent monographs: Jeremy K. Kessler, The 
Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2014) 
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than merely liberal or illiberal—is marked instead by mutually constitutive 
bonds of rights promotion and rights infringement, dissent and repression. 
 Part II begins by detailing how today’s mass politics of constitutional 
veneration actually mark a break from the public culture of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. In the wake of the Civil War and against the 
backdrop of industrial conflict, the country was consumed by profound social 
discord, including over the continuing political relevance of the Constitution. In 
Part III, I turn to a close examination of how the collective attitude toward the 
Constitution began to shift, especially with growing concerns about the internal 
and external threats facing the country. Drawing from original archival work, I 
demonstrate how a collection of pro-war organizations, operating in concert 
with public officials and corporate elites, rallied around the Constitution as the 
positive principle justifying American militarism abroad and a robust new 
security framework at home. Part IV then explores the basic policies civic and 
government actors pursued to promote both constitutional loyalty and the 
emerging security state; these policies centered on patriotic education, cultural 
assimilation, and the suppression of anti-constitutional sentiment. This pro-
Constitution campaign had the practical effect of fundamentally reshaping the 
public debate about the text’s legitimacy. Although constitutional skepticism 
persisted on the labor left and among middle-class reformers throughout the 
interwar period, constitutional defenders nonetheless succeeded in permanently 
linking constitutional support with patriotism in the mainstream public 
imagination. 
In conclusion, I suggest two long-term legacies of the historic 
interconnection between modern constitutional reverence and the rise of the 
national security state. First, I argue that while today’s constitutional advocates 
would certainly reject the regressive brand of politics that earlier defenders 
pursued, it may not be so easy to disassociate the current—presumably 
liberal—constitutional climate from its genesis a century ago. This is because 
constitutional debate today takes place against a backdrop of far greater 
ideological agreement (especially over basic questions of governmental 
structure) than that which existed in 1900. And indeed, the very space for 
today’s climate of self-reflection and critique was in part made possible by past 
practices of imposed deference and ideological repression, practices which 
essentially now go unnoticed and unacknowledged. Second, I also delineate 
how exceptionalist discourses around American constitutionalism have 
persisted well past World War I in validating national security prerogatives. 
The same early twentieth century arguments that linked the Constitution to a 
 
(arguing that even the embrace of civil libertarianism in the wake of World War I by some Progressive 
lawyers should be read as an effort to “strengthen rather than to circumscribe the administrative 
state”); and Jared A. Goldstein, The American Liberty League and the Rise of Constitutional 
Nationalism, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 287 (2014) (describing far right political uses of the Constitution and 
their destructive effects). 
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special national destiny were again at the heart of Cold War and post-9/11 
justifications for an aggressive security posture at home and abroad. All this 
speaks to the equivocal nature of our modern constitutional culture and thus the 
deep links between discourses of rights respect on the one hand and those of 
coercion on the other. 
I. 
TURN OF THE CENTURY AMERICA AND CONSTITUTIONAL DISILLUSIONMENT 
At first glance, it might be surprising to think of constitutional reverence, 
which appears inevitable in today’s public life, as ever being politically 
suspect. In the words of Laurence Tribe, loyalty to the text can seem for 
Americans like “the night sky,”20 a timeless feature of our collective past and 
the closest political fact we have to a natural one. Indeed, during many periods 
of American history, most organized constituencies—whatever their 
disagreements about the Constitution’s concrete meaning—have nonetheless 
taken the document as a given fact of political reality and even celebrated it.21 
But in the late nineteenth century, the experience of the Civil War and growing 
industrial strife cast a pall over the Constitution. Large swathes of the public 
worried whether the existing order was adequate to maintain social peace or to 
address new economic grievances. While most Americans refrained from 
embracing actual constitutional rupture and overthrow, the general tenor of 
public discourse was one of profound disappointment rather than fealty and 
veneration. In this Section, I provide a brief overview of the constitutional 
environment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—a time when 
the country witnessed judges, popular politicians, and even future presidents 
explicitly defending systematic textual revisions. Such facts highlight the depth 
of public skepticism vis-à-vis the Constitution as well as the significant 
challenges pro-Constitution activists faced in shifting the cultural climate 
toward greater support. 
A. The Civil War, Sectionalism, and Constitutional Disappointment 
The Civil War, with its reverberating legacy of bitterness and white 
supremacist violence, was one of the key reasons that the Constitution lost 
much of its previous luster. If anything, the war raised basic questions about 
the Constitution’s legitimacy. How could the text be thought of as a successful 
 
 20. Tribe, supra note 9, at 19. 
 21. For more on majority acceptance of constitutional legitimacy, especially during the early 
republic, see Lance Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793, 
31 WM. & MARY Q. 167, 168 (1974) (describing the willingness of most anti-Federalist voices to 
accept the inevitability of the legal and political system as a “quick apotheosis of the American 
Constitution” and “a phenomenon without parallel in the western world”); see also MICHAEL 
KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 29 
(1986) (referring to the “basic pattern of American constitutionalism as one of conflict within 
consensus”). 
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institutional experiment—let alone a mechanism that promoted national 
unity—if it had failed to head off such a cataclysmic social conflict? These 
questions circulated across sectional lines and punctured efforts to foster a 
culture of reverence around the document. 
Indeed, when politicians and civic leaders established the privately run 
Constitutional Centennial Commission to celebrate the text’s one hundredth 
anniversary, they failed to generate much public enthusiasm. The 
Commission’s efforts to produce countrywide events honoring the document 
foundered on what one key organizer called, “the entire absence of any interest 
or general sentiment in favor of the proposed celebration on the part of the 
public at large.”22 The organization could not convince Congress to provide 
funding or support, had limited success in attracting an official poet or orator, 
and received polite declines from many of those asked to attend the central 
celebration at Philadelphia’s Independence Square.23 
Explaining the collective mood of disinterest, E.L. Godkin, the founder of 
The Nation, wrote in the magazine that the recent war made it difficult to take 
seriously the worshipful tone of anniversary celebrations. He commented that 
for the “original [F]ramers” the text’s principal goal had been to address “two 
great difficulties”: “the union of slave and free States under a common 
government, and the merging of State allegiance [and] national allegiance in 
the mind of the citizens of the several States.”24 When measured against these 
central purposes, the Constitution could only be viewed as a “failure”25—a fact 
that was not lost on the public. 
The sense of constitutional disillusionment that the war provoked was 
particularly pronounced among specific political constituencies during and 
after Reconstruction. For many white Radical Republicans in the North, 
constitutional structures—such as the Supreme Court, the Electoral College, 
and the state-based representational system in the Senate—facilitated Southern 
intransigence and violence in the face of Reconstruction. This was because 
these institutions—the products of an antebellum accommodation with slavery 
and states’ rights—overrepresented ex-Confederate voices in government and 
thus often gave an effective veto to the Union’s very enemies when it came to 
much-needed racial reforms. Such critics of the Constitution had long been 
steeped in an Abolitionist reform movement, in which prominent figures like 
William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips denounced the text as an 
 
 22. See KAMMEN, supra note 21, at 128. See generally id. at 127–55 (explaining the many 
challenges facing the centennial celebration). 
 23. Id. at 136–37. In fact, no poet could be convinced, and Associate Justice Samuel Miller 
served as orator only after numerous other figures turned down the request. For an excellent account of 
the challenges facing the centennial celebration, see id. at 127–55. 
 24. E.L. Godkin, Some Things Overlooked at the Centennial, NATION, Sept. 22, 1887, at 226; 
see also KAMMEN, supra note 21, at 141. 
 25. Godkin, supra note 24, at 226. 
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“agreement with hell”26 and a “pro-slavery compact.”27 In the postwar period, 
confronted first by a resistant Southern president in Andrew Johnson and later 
by a Supreme Court willing to roll back the most transformative racial 
accomplishments of the era, Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus Stevens and 
others considered the constitutional order—with its intricate system of checks 
and balances—to be little more than a sustained infrastructure for protecting 
white supremacy. As Stevens reportedly told one interlocutor, in his view, the 
document was “a worthless bit of old parchment.”28 
As for many white supremacists in the former Confederacy, despite the 
utility of federalist structures in constraining Reconstruction, the Constitution 
nonetheless symbolized their own defeat. In the South, white bitterness over 
the war fed a politics of such intense hostility among sectionalists—those 
whose primary political allegiance remained to the Confederacy—that any 
national symbol, even the Declaration of Independence, became suspect. 
Before the Civil War, African Americans often celebrated Independence Day 
on July 5 as an explicit commentary on black enslavement and exclusion from 
the body politic.29 But after the war, July 4 became a day of massive black 
parades and festivities. At the same time, Southern whites now retreated 
indoors in silent protest. In the words of one South Carolina diarist, July 4 was 
a day that African Americans commemorated while “whites stay[ed] at home 
and work[ed].”30 With even the Declaration a fraught symbol, many die-hard 
 
 26. William Lloyd Garrison introduced a resolution before the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery 
Society in 1843, stating that “the compact which exists between the North and South is ‘a covenant 
with death, and an agreement with hell,’—involving both parties in atrocious criminality; and should 
be immediately annulled.” JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN 
AN UNJUST WORLD 253 n.7 (2011) (quoting WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963)). 
 27. WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION, A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT (New York, 
American Anti-Slavery Society, 3d ed. 1856). 
 28. RICHARD TAYLOR, DESTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION: PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF 
THE LATE WAR 299 (Richard B. Harwell ed., Longmans, Green & Co. 1955) (1879). This quote 
comes from a meeting between Thaddeus Stevens and Richard Taylor, a Confederate General during 
the war and son of President Zachary Taylor. Thus, one may well wonder whether Taylor, who saw 
Stevens as a bitter enemy, sought to smear Stevens by accusing him of lawlessness. Still, whether the 
quote is exact, it was certainly the case that Stevens, like many other Radical Republicans, considered 
the 1787 constitutional structure to be a significant obstacle to the project of racial transformation. 
 29. For example, Frederick Douglass’s famous 1852 address to the Antislavery Society of 
Rochester, “What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?” was delivered on July 5 because according to 
historian Mason Lowance, Douglass “did not wish to participate in the celebration of hypocrisy and 
could not join the festivities recalling the Declaration of Independence.” Mason Lowance, Frederick 
Douglass (1818–1895), in AGAINST SLAVERY: AN ABOLITIONIST READER 38, 38 (Mason Lowance 
ed., 2000). Also highlighting black anger at white American hypocrisy, Nat Turner planned his slave 
revolt to begin on July 4, 1831. MATTHEW DENNIS, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE LETTER DAYS: AN 
AMERICAN CALENDAR 287 n.18 (2002). 
 30. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 
289 (1988). 
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sectionalists associated the Constitution with perceived federal oppression and 
Northern control.31 
Constitutional skepticism persisted even among Southern racial 
conservatives, who accepted the need for reconciliation and thus defended 
national over sectional attachment. Future President Woodrow Wilson, the son 
of a Virginia slave owner and a rising Atlanta lawyer in the 1880s, embodied 
this “New Southern” desire for meaningful integration with the North.32 
Wilson’s central concern was that the South had become an economic 
backwater. As a consequence, he believed that the region should be remapped 
in modern industrial terms so that it shared the wealth of commercial growth 
and served as more than simply a supplier of raw materials to the North. But he 
worried that unless the Federal Constitution was dramatically reinterpreted by 
the courts, structurally altered by amendment, or even rewritten through a new 
convention, it would be incapable of facilitating the national policies that could 
place the South on an equal footing with the North. As Wilson wrote in 1885, 
whatever the wisdom of the initial design, it was increasingly unclear whether 
the text remained “adapted to serve the purposes for which it was intended.”33 
Influenced by Walter Bagehot’s 1867 work The English Constitution, he called 
for a parliamentary system with a strong prime minister.34 For Wilson, national 
cohesion actually required fundamental structural reform of the Constitution. 
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As with Southern sectionalists, Wilson was angered at how Northern 
elites had supposedly manipulated the text to serve Northern ends—problems 
that “the rude shock of the war”35 and Reconstruction made plain to him. 
Wilson maintained a strong commitment to black subordination, defending 
slavery as a wrongly maligned and benevolent, albeit paternalistic, institution. 
He claimed that the text had been “organized upon the initiative and primarily 
in the interest of the mercantile . . . classes”36 in the North. After the war, the 
text promoted a destructive project of racial readjustment, in which 
Republicans imposed black voting and legal protections on Southern whites, 
the region’s “real citizens.”37 In overseeing both Reconstruction and the “the 
sudden and absolute emancipation”38 of slaves, the Constitution, according to 
Wilson, had been complicit in “a dark chapter of history.”39 
In the end, however, perhaps the voice of constitutional disappointment 
that most powerfully captured the postwar age came from African Americans, 
the very community that men like Wilson thought the Constitution unduly 
advantaged. With the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, large 
numbers of African Americans began to embrace the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence as symbols of their own freedom and equality. 
But the steady move of the black community from bondage to liberty and back 
again to bondage left many of its members increasingly embittered by the 
hypocrisy of white America and the hollowness of constitutional protections. In 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases,40 
which struck down provisions of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, a wave of anger 
swept through both urban and rural black constituencies. In response to such 
outrage, Howard University professor B.K. Sampson called on African 
Americans to remain “loyal still”41 to the country and to maintain faith in the 
Constitution’s ideals, especially the egalitarian promise of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. He declared that the white “public mind is softening as it ripens” 
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and so the decision, whatever its consequences in the present, should not be 
read as “a finality.”42 
But for other black leaders, such counsel was nothing more than an 
exercise in self-delusion. According to African Methodist Episcopal (AME) 
Reverend Henry McNeal Turner, the decision above all highlighted the 
fundamental incompatibility between black interests and those of the broader 
white community. Ex-slaves and their former masters remained irreconcilably 
opposed, and so long as the polity preserved the economic and political power 
of the latter, through decisions such as the Civil Rights Cases, blacks owed no 
allegiance to the republic. In Turner’s words, “If the government that freed him 
cannot protect his freedom, then . . . he does not stand face to face with its laws 
and institutions, and the negro hereafter who will enlist in the armies of the 
government, or swear to defend the United States Constitution ought to be 
hung by the neck.” 43 For Turner, black emigration abroad was the only viable 
response in a context where “[t]he negro is literally driven out of the United 
States.”44 Under these circumstances, basic African American self-respect 
required conceiving of oneself as a “rebel to this nation” and treating the 
Constitution as “a dirty rag, a cheat, a libel,” “to be spit upon by every negro in 
the land.”45 
Turner was hardly alone among blacks during the late nineteenth century 
in calling for separation. As the old white oligarchy reclaimed its property and 
political authority across the former Confederacy, freed people particularly in 
the rural countryside saw themselves as exiles again in an oppressive land and 
often viewed the only solution to be emigration. Due to the prohibitive cost—
not to mention white Southern efforts to constrain black movement and to 
maintain their labor supply—very few blacks actually succeeded in leaving the 
country.46 But as African American activist and founder of the National 
Colored Colonization Council Henry Adams reported, by 1879, some 98,000 
blacks had enrolled with the Council as potential emigrants.47 Whether 
individuals ultimately escaped the South for Liberia, Haiti, Canada, or even 
states like Kansas (long associated with John Brown and radical abolitionism), 
the project of emigration constituted the largest black mass movement of the 
late nineteenth century. No doubt many middle-class and educated African 
Americans denounced the project as the worst brand of political defeatism. 
Those like Sampson, quoted above, saw it as a rejection of what African 
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Americans had fought and died for during the Civil War and as undermining 
the unity blacks needed in the present to achieve real formal equality under the 
Constitution. However, what allowed emigrationism to tap so deeply into 
poorer and rural constituencies were growing doubts that black freedom could 
ever be achieved under the Constitution, not to mention in a polity dominated 
by a white majority. 
B. Industrialization and Constitutional Opposition 
The second key force driving constitutional skepticism was the 
transformed economic landscape, which was marked by heightened 
bureaucracy, corporate concentration, and wild cycles of booms and busts. 
Such developments produced a highly inegalitarian society: by 1890, the top 1 
percent held 51 percent of all property, and the bottom 88 percent of the 
population controlled just 14 percent of the wealth.48 To make matters worse, 
the industrialization of the economy went hand in hand with the increasing 
control by corporate interests over political decision making. During what 
came to be called the “Gilded Age,” giant corporations wielded influence over 
politicians from both major parties at virtually every level of government, with 
railroad companies and industrial magnates enjoying particular access and 
privilege.49 
By contrast, large numbers of the urban and rural poor found themselves 
subject to market volatilities and increasingly draconian labor practices, with 
little protection offered by political and legal officials. For many farmers, 
workers, and middle-class reformers, the constitutional system and especially 
the federal judiciary—the single institution most closely identified with the 
text—seemed to be a critical obstacle to addressing these problems of 
destitution and social inequality. In fact, in the closing years of the nineteenth 
century, Populists, Progressives, and labor activists ubiquitously denounced the 
bench.50 Running in 1892 as the People’s Party candidate for president, James 
Weaver referred to John Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. Madison (1803) as 
a “gross usurpation” of power, which over time had allowed judges to operate 
as an “imperium in imperio.”51 Not to be outdone, Populist Governor of Oregon 
Sylvester Pennoyer, in another article condemning Marbury, went so far as to 
conclude that, “This unconstitutional usurpation of the law-making power by 
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the Federal courts is productive alone of confusion, anarchy and judicial 
despotism.”52 Such claims were also commonplace in the labor movement. 
Samuel Gompers, founder of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and 
representative of the more conservative “prudential unionist”53 stance, viewed 
the Supreme Court as little more than a class instrument and judicial review as 
fundamentally illegitimate. In his words, “in exercising this prerogative the 
Supreme Court usurped power that did not constitutionally belong to it.”54 
Although the argument about “usurpation” separated an ideal text from a 
corrupt practice, the close association between the Supreme Court and the 
Constitution increasingly generated direct attacks on the whole system. Weaver 
may have believed that judicial review contradicted the Framers’ intentions, 
but he nonetheless admitted that judicial power was consistent with the 
generally undemocratic structure of the constitutional process. Noting that only 
the House of Representatives was directly elected by popular vote in the 1890s, 
Weaver wrote that “the fact remains beyond dispute that under our present 
system, three out of the four subdivisions of Government are practically placed 
beyond the control of the multitude.”55 For Walter Clark, the Populist Chief 
Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court and one of the state’s most 
popular politicians during the era, this meant that although the Constitution’s 
Framers did not intend judicial review, it nonetheless conformed to the broader 
drift of the text. Judicial review had been allowed to flourish because the 
system as a whole was “never democratic.”56 Calling for a new constitutional 
convention, Clark viewed the Electoral College, the indirect election of 
Senators, and the lifetime appointment of federal judges as antiquated 
holdovers from a feudal and monarchical age. These veto points not only 
undermined the ability of citizens to respond effectively to dramatic economic 
changes, they also were “anachronism[s] . . . a survival from times when the 
people’s representatives could not legislate without the assent of the monarch 
expressly given to each act.”57 
The fact that even sitting judges adopted such views demonstrated that 
arguments regarding an undemocratic Constitution reached far beyond agrarian 
rabble-rousers or labor protestors. They formed part of a broad public discourse 
in which countless muckraking exposés and historical works highlighted the 
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democratic weaknesses of the constitutional system.58 Similar to Clark’s views 
above, these exposés tended to explain the era’s constitutional failures by 
revisiting the text’s framing and ratification. According to such writings, the 
Constitution was structurally incapable of addressing mass economic 
grievances, because it had been constructed to serve propertied interests and to 
thwart popular will. These books effectively espoused views similar to those of 
some Southern white supremacists, albeit to very different ends. In particular, 
Beard’s 1913 work An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States depicted the Constitution as a counterrevolutionary document 
pressed on poor farmer-debtors by wealthy bondholders, and it became the 
period’s “generally accepted view of the founding.”59 According to Vernon 
Louis Parrington, summarizing the turn of the century and Progressive era 
literature in 1930, the Constitution was nothing more than “a deliberate and 
well-considered protective measure designed by able men who represented the 
aristocracy and wealth of America; a class instrument directed against the 
democracy.”60 
Even anti-Populist and more establishment public intellectuals repeated 
this sentiment. William Allen White, famed newspaper editor and author of the 
1896 editorial “What’s the Matter with Kansas?”, described the Constitution in 
terms that echoed the most radical agrarian or labor activist: 
[I]t seems necessary to inquire if this capture of the Constitution by 
our only aristocracy—that of capital—was not in truth merely a 
recapture of what was intended in the beginning by the fathers to 
belong to the minority. The checks and balances put in that 
Constitution to guard against the rule of the majority protected slavery 
for fifty years, and perhaps they bound the nation to the rule of the 
privileged classes in the nineties. Perhaps these same checks and 
balances were put into the Constitution deliberately—the judiciary 
which vetoes statutes and remakes laws, the rigidity of the 
fundamental law to amendment, the remoteness of the senators from 
popular election and control.61 
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Similarly, Herbert Croly, the Progressive co-founder of the New Republic and a 
key intellectual figure behind Theodore Roosevelt’s 1912 presidential 
campaign, accepted that the Constitution was undemocratic in original design 
and ill suited for contemporary needs.62 Most telling, Croly concluded that the 
greatest inhibition to change was not the judiciary or a specific institutional 
structure, but any lingering loyalty Americans still had for the text as it was. In 
his view, such loyalty had to be fundamentally repudiated, because by 
“consecrat[ing] one particular machinery of possible righteous expression,” 
constitutional veneration transformed “reverence for order” into a destructive 
“reverence for an established order.”63 
Croly championed the need for a “New Nationalism,” a term Roosevelt 
adopted in 1912 and credited to him, and presented constitutional loyalty as 
compromising rather than promoting shared national identity and purpose. 
Thus, the 1912 campaign saw the top two vote-getters in the presidential 
election either explicitly defending alternative constitutional models or closely 
aligning with voices deeply skeptical of the text. If anything, Wilson’s ultimate 
election to the presidency—despite having authored multiple books suggesting 
the incompatibility between national strength and the existing constitutional 
structure—speaks to a very different politics of national identity and patriotism 
at the time. To make the point more sharply, Wilson strongly considered 
nominating constitutional opponent and fellow Southerner Walter Clark for the 
Supreme Court.64 Thus, not only could a president question the text, but a 
potential Supreme Court justice could even argue for its outright rejection. 
As the twentieth century began, discontent with the Constitution came 
from a remarkably diverse array of social groups, running the gamut from labor 
and agrarian activists to newly freed African Americans, middle-class 
reformers, public intellectuals, and Southern white supremacists. Although 
each group may have been disaffected for competing reasons, such widespread 
concerns raised real questions about whether the document could cohere a 
polity wracked by class, racial, and regional divisions. Ultimately, it would 
take a new war for the Constitution’s defenders to begin to reshape this public 
debate. As the following Sections explore, for various government and civic 
leaders, the Constitution became a rallying cry to justify both American 
involvement in World War I and the Red Scare that followed it. Against the 
backdrop of external intervention and internal labor conflict, such figures 
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argued that constitutional loyalty was a central precondition of patriotic 
citizenship and called on an expanded national security infrastructure to ensure 
widespread public commitment to the text and its basic values. 
II. 
WORLD WAR I AND THE MODERN ORIGINS OF CONSTITUTIONAL VENERATION 
In April 1917, the same month as the United States’ entry into World War 
I, a recently formed group, the National Association for Constitutional 
Government (NACG) published the first issue of Constitutional Review. In the 
issue, the group included a manifesto of principles explaining the reasons for 
its creation. According to the editorial, whatever may have been the 
appropriateness of criticizing the Constitution in the years before the war, that 
appropriateness had now disappeared. Faced with profound threats, citizens 
needed to recognize the real differences between the United States and its 
foreign enemies, which ranged from the German Empire to revolutionary 
socialists and anarchists. For those in the NACG, the Constitution, more than 
anything else in U.S. history, safeguarded the nation’s essential institutions and 
separated a free American republic from monarchical tyranny or, even worse, 
“the chaotic rule of an irresponsible and absolutistic democracy.”65 However, 
as the editorial continued, at a moment when these “institutions [were] gravely 
menaced,”66 “several millions of Americans” seemed indifferent to the 
Constitution’s fate or even “advocate[d] what the Association deprecate[d].”67 
In the words of the NACG, “[t]he Constitution [was] in danger of assassination 
in the house of its friends.”68 The only solution was a concerted effort by “all 
right-minded men” to revive “the real patriotism of the great mass of the 
American people” and to defend both the Constitution and the government it 
had established from assault.69 
The NACG was only one of a plethora of political associations that gained 
prominence in the context of the war and intertwined loyalty to the text with 
aggressive national security politics. In this Part, I examine the deep 
interconnections between calls for a more robust security infrastructure and 
those for a public culture of constitutional respect during the 1910s and 1920s. 
I highlight the overlapping membership of pro-Constitution and pro-war 
activism, as well as how constitutional discourses helped infuse security 
practices with a higher normative purpose. At the same time, I also show how 
the context of war reframed the perceived stakes of debates over the 
Constitution’s legitimacy. In particular, concerns about external threats and 
internal social disorder led many Americans to see the Constitution, whatever 
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its flaws, as an unassailable foundation for shared national identity. Security 
rhetoric thus played a critical role in generating a new mass base for 
constitutional veneration. 
A. The Interconnection of Pro-Constitution and Pro-War Activism 
Although we often think of constitutional commitment as an important 
check on national security excesses, such commitment took root in modern 
American society precisely through wartime efforts to expand the national 
security framework. Constitutionalists at the time overwhelmingly advocated 
for both devotion to the document and heightened militarization of collective 
life. Indeed, most of the key figures behind war mobilization efforts were the 
very same ones pressing for greater popular constitutional reverence. The 
National Association for Constitutional Government provides just one telling 
example. Its founder and head, David Jayne Hill, was a former ambassador to 
Germany and president of the University of Rochester; he also served as an 
honorary vice president of the American Defense Society70 and spoke routinely 
on behalf of the National Security League (NSL).71 The Defense Society and 
the League were two of the most prominent military preparedness 
organizations. Early champions of a permanent civilian defense infrastructure, 
these groups advocated for the expansion of military funding, the creation of 
executive branch institutions overseen by military experts to coordinate defense 
policy, and compulsory peacetime military service and training for all able-
bodied male citizens.72 
Hill’s movement between the NACG, the Defense Society, and the NSL 
was hardly novel, and indeed common membership and leadership were 
widespread across the various groups and across pro-Constitution and pro-
security activists more generally. For example, Nicholas Murray Butler, 
President of Columbia University for the first four decades of the twentieth 
century, was both a frequent author for the NACG’s Constitutional Review and 
an executive committee member of the National Security League.73 James 
Beck, Solicitor General between 1921 and 1925 and author of countless books 
and articles praising the wisdom of the Constitution, was also heavily involved 
with the League. He participated in its “patriotic education” campaigns during 
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the war, writing the preface to one of the group’s speaker handbooks.74 After 
the war, the NSL independently distributed his reflections on the Constitution, 
by, for example, sending out 10,000 free copies of his 1922 collected volume, 
The Constitution of the United States.75 The League had a similar relationship 
with Charles Warren, Wilson’s former Assistant Attorney General, editorial 
board member of Constitutional Review, and Pulitzer Prize-winning 
constitutional scholar.76 Given this overlap of membership and ideological 
goals, it is hardly surprising that pro-Constitution and pro-security 
organizations often worked together on joint initiatives. Many even formed 
umbrella groups to coordinate their efforts, like the establishment in 1922 of 
the Sentinels of the Republic, which united the American Defense Society, the 
National Association for Constitutional Government, the Constitutional Liberty 
League, and the American Legion, a powerful veterans group formed in 1919.77 
At an organizational level, a primary reason for this overlap had to do 
with their sources of funding and the energy behind drives for military 
preparedness and greater constitutional loyalty. For most of these civic 
associations, the primary financing came from the business community in New 
York City. For instance, the NSL’s main donors included corporate tycoons 
such as George H. Putnam, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Henry C. Frick, and Simon 
Guggenheim.78 This concentration of influence was hardly uncommon during 
the age. As historian Sven Beckert writes, at the turn of the century, the city’s 
mercantile elite in particular “dominated the nation’s trade, production, and 
finance” and enjoyed an outsized political power that “reverberated . . . from 
City Hall to the White House.”79 Underscoring the point, when Robert Lee 
Bullard, U.S. Army General during World War I and President of the NSL in 
the 1920s, retired from the military following the war, he relied not on the 
federal government but on private capital for his financial security. New York 
City businessmen, including Vanderbilt, raised $20,000 as a lump sum 
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retirement fund and then facilitated his rise to presidency of the League.80 In 
effect, the influence and goals of the New York City mercantile elite, who were 
primarily concerned with protecting private property and maintaining social 
order, helped cement the connection throughout the 1910s and 1920s between a 
strengthened national security state and efforts to popularize the Constitution. 
B. The Constitution as the Positive Principle for a New Security State 
Besides sharing business sponsorship, the profound symbiotic relationship 
between the two projects also revolved around their deeper ideological 
continuities. Critically, the linkage of the Constitution with national security 
enhanced the popular legitimacy of arguments both for an entrenched security 
infrastructure and for greater constitutional loyalty. To begin, the most 
common criticism leveled at advocates of military preparedness and American 
entry into World War I (as well as global power politics generally) was that 
American interventionism abroad and the creation of a permanent war footing 
at home were inconsistent with national principles. In particular, such policies 
went against two popular assumptions: 1) skepticism of a standing army and 
belief in transparent decision making through civilian control; and 2) wariness 
of entanglement with European rivalries. 
Indeed, during the early republic, extensive hostility existed toward 
professional standing armies: Virginia Congressman John Randolph famously 
described them as “mercenaries” and “ragamuffins.”81 Even a century later, the 
widespread view remained that standing armies only promoted the rise of 
military despotism. At the same time, a classic tenet of American foreign 
policy held that isolation from Europe and its internecine conflicts sustained 
domestic tranquility. In Federalist No. 8, Alexander Hamilton famously argued 
that the barrier of the Atlantic Ocean meant that as long as the republic did not 
fracture internally, its external position would be one of calm.82 He concluded: 
If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an 
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great 
distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue 
too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any 
dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this 
position, be necessary to our security.83 
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Such anti-interventionism and anti-militarism counseled against the push by 
pro-war activists toward both far greater global authority and its related 
domestic security requirements. 
These longstanding views raised significant doubts about the American-
ness of preparedness efforts, let alone the broader militarization of civilian life. 
In response, members of the Defense Society and the NSL developed a series 
of related arguments that bound national security vigilance and American 
interventionism with the protection and promotion of the Constitution. First 
and foremost, proponents of preparedness argued that the Constitution was 
ultimately what defined the national ethos. Thus, defending “Americanism” 
was nothing more than supporting the governmental system and public culture 
generated by the text. This constitutionally grounded vision of national identity 
had two effects: it placed the Constitution at the center of American 
exceptionalism and provided an implicit justification for greater militarism and 
global authority. 
According to pro-war activists, the feature that most distinguished the 
American political project from Old World Europe was the Constitution. 
Whereas European communities were the product of feudalism as well as 
political and religious absolutism, the Constitution highlighted the extent to 
which the American experiment had been built from its founding on an effort 
to fulfill Enlightenment principles. As David Jayne Hill, founder of the NACG, 
wrote in his 1916 book, Americanism: What It Is, the Federal Constitution 
above all “developed here in America a new estimate of human values, and this 
had led to a new understanding of life.”84 Contrasting European monarchical 
despotism with American commitments to liberty and self-government, 
declared that the “original and distinctive contribution of the American mind to 
political theory” was the focus on eliminating “forever the recurrence of 
absolutism in every form, whether official or popular, whether of dominant 
individuals or of popular majorities.”85 The Constitution was the living 
embodiment of these goals and had produced a phenomenon unique in global 
history: it transformed a set of distinct North American colonies into a single, 
unified, and powerful nation bound to notions of universality and republican 
freedom. In effect, Hill and other World War I era defenders of the 
Constitution mapped out an early twentieth century variation of what scholar 
Nikhil Pal Singh and others have called “American universalism”86—namely 
the idea that what marks out the United States as exceptional is its status as the 
place where Enlightenment commitments truly took historical root. 
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At stake in such claims was more than the belief that the Constitution 
safeguarded liberties at home. It also upheld the view that the Constitution 
spoke to a special mission abroad. According to Hill, European powers sought 
to divide the world according to a principle of “imperialism”87 and thus treated 
other communities as little more than material spoils. Given these facts, a 
peaceful and stable international order required a strong American presence. 
The institutions and culture of American constitutionalism—premised on 
checks and balances, deep-rooted interpretative legal traditions, and respect for 
fundamental rights—were “antithetical to Imperialism, whose watchword is 
unlimited power”88 and thus offered a necessary counterweight on the global 
stage. In opposition to European-style empires, the constitutional principle 
meant that American authority was centrally about creating the conditions in 
foreign, oftentimes non-European, societies for limited government and 
peaceful self-rule. Distinguishing U.S. colonial control over the Philippines 
following the Spanish-American War from European practices, Hill argued that 
American conduct on the island had been a step in the advancement of both 
civilization and international peace.89 Glossing over the brutal American 
suppression of local independence efforts, he declared, “we have taken . . . a 
population in its political childhood and conscientiously striven to lay the 
foundations for its future self-government.”90 Similarly, with the world 
increasingly consumed in global conflict, the United States had a responsibility 
to ensure that the institutions and culture of constitutionalism prevailed over 
those of imperialism in the international order.91 
Furthermore, according to Hill and other pro-war activists, the United 
States had no choice but to enter the war and to claim a greater interventionist 
presence. Especially with the global repercussions of the Russian Revolution, 
European disorder had begun to reach American shores. This fact not only 
counseled for participation in the war effort abroad but also underscored the 
centrality of domestic security measures necessary to safeguard the 
constitutional order. As the NSL’s Executive Committee declared, American 
identity sprang “only from the protection of personal liberty and the right of 
property—the right of individual possession of property as guaranteed by the 
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Constitution. He who does not believe in this cannot be an American.”92 
Arguing that Russian revolutionists of all stripes were massing in the United 
States to “overthrow . . . American institutions and ideals,”93 the NSL 
maintained that preparedness and greater security vigilance were central to 
ensuring the basic survival of the Constitution. In essence, while such 
associations accepted public arguments that heightened militarism and global 
interventionism were historically novel, they contended that a new national 
security infrastructure had become critical to preserving a distinctively 
American way of life. The country not only had a global responsibility to 
protect constitutional values and institutions at home and abroad, but 
international events left it with no other alternative. 
C. Constitutional Devotion Finds a Popular Base 
Crucially, just as the discourse of American constitutionalism justified 
military preparedness and global interventionism, so too did security discourses 
help transform the popular mood around the Constitution. The war and fears of 
revolutionary extremism invigorated pro-Constitution groups and allowed the 
politics of constitutional loyalty to tap into a broad public base. As the 
foregoing comments by the NSL imply, in the decades before World War I, the 
Constitution had become most associated with corporate privilege. The public 
overwhelmingly viewed defenders of the Constitution as legal and business 
elites who were wary of any reform to property relations. Panegyrics on the 
Constitution came from familiar sources such as the American Bar Association 
(ABA), the National Civic Federation, chambers of commerce, and Rotary and 
Kiwanis clubs. Progressive journalist Norman Hapgood derisively referred to 
these champions of the Constitution as those “professional patriot[s]” 
committed to “defending the existing property and political system without 
change.”94 Indeed, while significant voices among industrial workers, rural 
farmers, African Americans, Southern sectionalists, and the urban middle class 
all expressed critiques of the constitutional order and its legitimacy, only a 
comparatively narrow demographic wholeheartedly defended the text as it 
existed or asserted the Constitution’s fundamental importance to nationhood. 
But war and its aftermath generated a much broader audience willing to 
embrace a culture of constitutional reverence. 
In large measure, the conflict in Europe highlighted for many white 
Americans, especially Protestants, the sense that the country they knew was 
coming apart at the seams, and that foreign danger required rallying around 
existing symbols of social order. In the half century leading up to World War I, 
virtually all the basic elements that had long defined American identity faced 
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extreme pressure. In particular, the United States had begun as a specifically 
Anglo settler project, combining explicit racial hierarchies and territorial 
conquest with republican commitments to internal equality and producerist 
ethics.95 By the early twentieth century, however, the closing of the American 
frontier raised basic questions concerning land access and the republican 
promise of broad individual proprietorship.96 At the same time, 
industrialization left growing numbers of white Protestants, long considered 
privileged insiders, subject to the vagaries of a wage economy.97 Even worse, 
they found themselves competing over menial jobs with an influx of new and 
ethnically distinct immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, many of 
whom were Catholic.98 Furthermore, while the end of Reconstruction ensured 
the preservation of white supremacy, it nonetheless left a history of black 
emancipation and formal legal equality that challenged the racial basis of the 
republic.99 
With the social fabric seeming to unravel at home and the country facing 
war abroad, a significant number of white Americans reassessed their 
relationship to the Constitution. Whatever may have been its weaknesses, the 
text nonetheless connected them, in the twentieth century, to what they viewed 
as the golden age of the republic. Although the Constitution’s principal backers 
had been mainly business elites, they were nonetheless able to strike a nerve 
with a growing public sentiment.100 In effect, they conveyed the message that, 
as much as the country may have changed in terms of size, economic structure, 
or ethnic composition, what remained constant was the Constitution. In a time 
of war, this document—the country’s lodestar—needed to be embraced as a 
sacred text. 
Against this backdrop, the idea that so-called 100 percent Americanism101 
required fealty to the Constitution emerged for the first time as a defining mass 
political commitment. According to legal scholar Mark Shulman, despite its 
New York corporate sponsorship, “[b]y mid-1916[,] the NSL had some 50,000 
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members nationally, organized into 155 branches in 42 states. By the end of the 
year, membership had doubled, with 250 chapters and 100,000 members.”102 In 
large numbers, returning soldiers joined veterans groups like the American 
Legion, which took constitutional loyalty as a guiding principle along with the 
need to protect the Constitution absolutely from all perceived threats.103 The 
Second Ku Klux Klan, born in 1915, had four million members by the mid-
1920s and combined white Protestant supremacy with an extreme commitment 
to the Constitution. Underlining their belief in the tie between nation and text, 
during Klan initiation or “naturalization” ceremonies, new members were 
questioned about the seven sacred symbols of Klankraft and what they 
represented: one of these symbols was the flag, and it was meant to denote the 
Constitution.104 
But even if World War I witnessed a profound shift in constitutional 
mood, defenders of the document still faced significant popular discontent with 
and even outright opposition to the constitutional system. Disillusionment had 
not disappeared; changes in public discourse simply meant that it now existed 
alongside an organized and mass politics of textual loyalty. As the following 
Part discusses, pro-Constitution groups responded to this reality of divided 
popular opinion by pursuing a series of strategies to produce widespread 
affective attachment to the text. In the process, they sought to form a new type 
of American citizen, one that psychologically identified with the constitutional 
state and was willing to defend it against external and internal foes, by force if 
necessary. 
III. 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FORGING OF A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL 
CITIZENSHIP 
Especially in the context of war and the United States’ growing global 
presence, certain civic and governmental actors saw constitutional commitment 
as the ultimate national security objective. They held that political 
disagreements about social policy or how best to interpret the Constitution had 
to take place against a backdrop of shared popular support for the document, 
both as a governing institutional structure and as a national symbol. But 
defenders of the Constitution faced a significant problem: How do you foster a 
public culture of devotion to the text—and with it, devotion to a set of 
institutions associated with the federal government—against a backdrop of 
extensive disenchantment?  During the early decades of the twentieth 
century, American constitutionalists ultimately responded to this problem by 
employing methods familiar to the history of modern state building, but hardly 
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consistent with a liberal civic culture. Pro-war champions of the Constitution 
emphasized three related approaches: 1) utilizing educational campaigns to 
generate deference toward government institutions; 2) enforcing cultural 
assimilation and homogeneity; and 3) applying a new security apparatus to root 
out those individuals and groups deemed enemies of the Constitution. In the 
process, they spearheaded a far-reaching loyalty campaign unlike any in 
American history and, in doing so, fundamentally transformed popular 
assumptions both about the relationship between the Constitution and 
patriotism and about the legitimacy of coercive federal authority. 
A. Patriotic Education and the Deferential Citizen 
Even if constitutional veneration increasingly tapped into a mass base 
during World War I, civic associations and public officials still faced real 
constitutional distrust and a divided—rather than ideologically uniform— 
public. The first method that officials and activists employed to transform 
collective sentiment was a vigorous education campaign to “Populariz[e] the 
Federal Constitution.”105 As the editors of Constitutional Review asserted, 
although dangerous revolutionary groups were “impervious alike to logic and 
to facts,”106 most citizens would come to identify with the Constitution if 
properly taught about its essential features. Calling for “a campaign of counter-
education,”107 the Review stated that “the great mass of intelligent American 
citizens, who are in danger of being misled and corrupted by . . . insidious 
propaganda, should be thoroughly instructed in the fundamental principles of 
the American system of government and the contents and meaning of the great 
charter of their liberties.”108 The core ambition of these efforts was to foster 
within citizens a sense of respect for government institutions and to groom the 
type of political subject who would be obedient to the existing legal structure 
and committed to the state’s security objectives. As the motto for one widely 
read pamphlet, The United States Constitution Simplified, declared: “Don’t 
Quarrel with Your Government; Read Your Constitution.”109 
For today’s defenders of constitutional loyalty, like Tribe or Stone, such a 
brand of citizenship is the very opposite of what they associate with a public 
culture of constitutional commitment.110 Tribe’s Constitution, understood as a 
“verb” or a “practice,” provides a shared public tradition of self-critique and 
progressive improvement.111 Indeed, he and others imagine this tradition as 
fundamentally open ended and flexible, able to adapt to shifting social values, 
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and, most importantly, able to provide a powerful language of dissent from 
prevailing but unjust laws. Thus, today’s defenders may well dismiss these 
early constitutionalists as simply reducing the Constitution to a conservative 
and hawkish agenda and treating constitutional education as an opportunity for 
right-wing propaganda. As hinted above, pro-Constitution forces in the 1910s 
and 1920s were certainly more prominent on the political right. They also often 
subscribed to a formalistic theory of constitutional interpretation, one bound to 
the Framers’ intent, respect for property rights, the defense of limited federal 
government, and skepticism of both “class legislation” and democratic 
excess.112 
It should be noted, however, that constitutional education programs were 
not directly about interpretative disagreements between the right and left. 
Programs focused far less on which theory of constitutional meaning was most 
appropriate and far more on the essential justness, in broad terms, of the 
Constitution as a political and legal order. Indeed, this is why activities such as 
mass celebrations of the Constitution or school-mandated textual lessons were 
able to generate extensive support outside the political right. At the time, 
constitutionalists were responding to a more profound dilemma than the 
meaning of the words in the text. Given the fallout of the Civil War and the 
realities of industrial inequality, many turn-of-the-century Americans 
questioned whether the structure of the Constitution itself had failed. They 
doubted whether the institutions it established, such as the Senate, the Supreme 
Court, or the President, had proven adequate as processes for political decision 
making. Pro-Constitution activists saw disappointment with the Constitution as 
creating a real legitimacy problem for the federal government and consequently 
its security goals. They therefore aimed to silence first-order disagreements in 
society about whether to retain existing institutions at all. Educational 
campaigns were at root about creating and cementing the boundaries of dissent, 
thereby promoting universal loyalty to a background set of processes that 
would be placed beyond dispute. In other words, World War I era 
constitutionalists recognized the precariousness of the prevailing political 
system and sought to tame dissent and thereby make it safe. 
In order to establish this deeper foundational agreement, such pro-
Constitution groups developed a multi-pronged educational campaign aimed 
not at promoting rational and autonomous citizen-agents—in the mold of 
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Tribe’s or Stone’s civic vision—but instead at instilling an unreflective and 
deferential identification with the constitutional state. The National Security 
League pressed for September 17 to be designated as a national holiday, 
“Constitution Day.” The goal was to use commemorative events to teach “the 
people in true Americanism and sound and intelligent patriotism” and, thus, to 
dispel the seductiveness of “bolshevism and the other alien cults which are 
attacking the foundations of our institutions.”113 Although it would take eight 
decades for Congress to eventually establish the holiday, the NSL, working in 
concert with other like-minded groups, such as the Constitution Anniversary 
Association, generated widespread observance during the postwar period. The 
year 1919 saw governors of twenty states issue official proclamations declaring 
September 17 to be Constitution Day. Alfred Smith of New York announced, 
“I know that the citizens of this state will welcome the opportunity of 
demonstrating their love of country by participating in the nation-wide 
celebration of the signing of the Federal Constitution.”114 That year, some 
twenty thousand meetings were held across the country in celebration of the 
text.115 As Constitutional Review breathlessly told its readers, “If the average 
attendance was no more than five hundred persons, that would mean that, on 
that day, ten million[] of our people renewed their allegiance to the 
Constitution, were instructed as to its transcendent merits, and recorded their 
purpose to uphold its [sic] against all assaults.”116 By 1923, observance had 
grown to such an extent that the American Bar Association and the National 
Education Association labeled the whole week “Constitution Week” and 
strongly encouraged schools to use part of each day for constitutional 
instruction. The War Department even ordered all military bases to engage in 
commemorative exercises.117 
The educational campaign also included broad distribution of 
constitutional material, comprising countless pamphlets praising the document 
(such as those already mentioned by James Beck and Charles Warren118) as 
well as copies of the text itself. For example, the National Association for 
Constitutional Government published what it called a Pocket Edition of the 
Constitution of the United States and distributed 50,000 copies in 1920.119 
According to historian Kathleen Blee, the Women’s Klan similarly produced “a 
detailed guide to the proper display of the American flag and a pocket-sized 
version of the U.S. Constitution,” each booklet emblazoned with the Women’s 
Ku Klux Klan logo.120 The National Security League even provided summer 
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correspondence courses on the Constitution for adults.121 Also beginning in 
1919, chambers of commerce, Rotary clubs, the ABA, and over a thousand 
newspapers worked together on the National Oratorical Contest in which 
private and public high school students gave speeches on the virtues of the 
Constitution.122 According to the ABA’s Committee on American Citizenship, 
by the mid-1920s “more than a million and a half young people” took part 
annually, in the process becoming “thoroughly educated in the Constitution.”123 
Of the 1924 contest, scholar Michael Kammen writes that the “seven finalists 
spoke for twelve minutes . . . at the DAR [Daughters of the American 
Revolution] auditorium in Washington before an audience that included Calvin 
Coolidge and the president of the American Bar Association. Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes and four associate justices of the Supreme Court served 
as judges.”124 
Perhaps the most central constitutional educational initiative focused on 
compelling all schools, from grade school to university, to impose 
constitutional instruction as a requirement of graduation. Combining forces 
with the ABA’s Citizenship Committee, the American Political Science 
Association in the early 1920s put together a model statute for state adoption. 
Samuel Weaver of the Washington State Bar Association described the basic 
elements of the proposal: 
1) Below the eighth grade the teaching of patriotism and citizenship; 
2) beginning with the eighth grade, regular but elementary instruction 
in the principles of government; 3) no student to be admitted to a high 
school or a normal school without having met these requirements; 4) in 
all high schools, colleges, and universities regular courses of study of 
not less than three full periods per week throughout the school year; 
5) no person to be granted a certificate to teach until he shall have 
passed a satisfactory examination upon the provisions and principles of 
our constitutional system. This law would require not only that the 
Constitution be taught in the schools, but that the students should be 
required to study it and to pass a satisfactory examination upon its 
principles.125 
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These calls to action paid immediate dividends; historian Jill Lepore tells us 
that over the course of the 1920s, the number of states mandating constitutional 
instruction rose from twenty-three in 1923 to forty-three by 1931.126 
Taken together, these educational initiatives, motivated by the need to 
establish the boundaries of acceptable disagreement and thus tame dissent, 
highlighted three aspects of deferential citizenship: ideological uniformity, 
constitutional duty or obligation, and reverence for the Founders. The vision 
for school instruction best captures the first aspect. For backers of the bills, 
which ranged from professional bodies and veterans groups like the American 
Legion and the Grand Army of the Republic to pro-Constitution organizations 
and even the KKK,127 the goal was to ensure not just any mode of 
constitutional education but what Weaver called a “uniformity of 
instruction.”128 According to civic associations, no law would be successful 
unless schools across the country employed the same nationalized teaching 
material. Only then could “universal loyalty” to the Constitution be “secured” 
“regardless of state lines.”129 
To this end, the National Security League and other associations 
generated a plethora of manuals and booklets meant to ensure the right type of 
instruction.130 Such classroom material was often framed as an exercise in 
ritual and memorization rather than an open-ended inquiry. For instance, one 
commonly used text, Our Constitution in My Town and My Life, written for 
teenagers by Etta Leighton (the Civic Secretary of the National Security 
League), consisted of over a hundred mechanical questions and answers: 
84. What has our Supreme Court . . . been called? “The balance wheel 
of the Constitution. The high guardian of the Constitution itself.” 
. . . . 
91. What distinguishes our Government and makes it a safer guardian 
of the people’s rights than the governments of Great Britain or France? 
The Supreme Court, because it protects the people even from tyranny 
of the Government itself.131 
Underscoring the connection between constitutional instruction and the 
creation of ideological consensus, Federal District Judge Martin Wade declared 
that anyone who questioned the viability of the Constitution should not be 
allowed to teach it: “I would not have in an American college a teacher or 
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professor who . . . even harbors a dream that some day this government will 
fail. . . . I would not tolerate a teacher . . . who . . . cannot find in discussing 
problems of American government more to glorify than to condemn.”132 
Similarly, according to one 1923 ABA report, “[t]he schools of America should 
no more consider graduating a student who lacks faith in our government than 
a school of theology should consider graduating a minister who lacks faith in 
God.”133 
Alongside uniformity, constitutional education was also meant to create a 
particular theory of political membership. Constitutionalists found it important 
to develop within Americans a greater awareness of the duties and obligations 
of citizenship in order to enhance their devotional capacity and willingness to 
sacrifice personal ends for the nation. According to the same ABA report 
quoted above, “[t]he gravest danger is the gross indifference of our people to 
the duties of citizenship.”134 Expanding on the point, Robert Lee Bullard, 
National Security League President, often gave a stump speech called “The 
Meaning of Citizenship.” In it, he argued that the Constitution established a 
system of government that could not last without the willingness of citizens to 
fight on its behalf—politically and militarily if necessary: “We hear all together 
too much about ‘rights’ . . . and too little about duty, obligation and 
responsibility. . . . The outstanding obligation is by force of arms to defend our 
government and maintain the Constitution of the United States.”135 
This notion that citizens should feel a sense of duty to sacrifice on behalf 
of the Constitution highlights why constitutional champions, like Bullard, also 
defended universal and mandatory military training, even during peacetime. 
Indeed, support for such training was yet another point of contact between pro-
Constitution and pro-security advocacy. As Henry Litchfield West, the 
Executive Secretary of the NSL and former Commissioner of the District of 
Columbia,136 warned, “Citizenship means everything or nothing.”137 That is, if 
Americans had neither the capacity nor the willingness to bear arms for the 
republic, citizenship itself was rendered an empty concept. Thus, for David 
Jayne Hill, constitutional instruction and armed instruction went hand in hand, 
because military training produced another key method for citizens to learn the 
importance of respect for the constitutional state. Arguing for the basic 
interconnection between the two forms of education, he told one audience, 
“[E]very able-bodied young man in our country should first be well instructed 
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in the meaning and value of our free institutions, and taught a wholesome 
respect for civil authority, and then be impressed with the privilege and 
obligation of a full preparation of mind and body to defend them.”138 
Finally, in addition to ideological uniformity and a sense of duty, 
constitutionalists saw their educational campaign as a means to elevate the 
status of the text’s Framers. To the extent that Americans embraced the genius 
of the Constitution’s Founders and saw them as uniquely skilled in political 
creation, citizens would be willing to identify emotionally with the document 
itself. Thus, the pamphlets, speeches, and teaching material generated during 
the period focused overwhelmingly on the virtue and wisdom of the Founders. 
For Leslie Shaw, former Governor of Iowa and Treasury Secretary under 
Teddy Roosevelt, “the Constitutional Fathers” were a “picked body of 
men . . . recognized as surpassing any equal number ever gathered for any 
purpose.”139 
George Washington, in particular, enjoyed an exalted space in 
constitutionalist discourse; he was described time and again as the Framer most 
central to the decision to hold a convention and later to the text’s ratification. 
According to Charles Warren, “without [his] ardent advocacy . . . and the 
confidence inspired in the people by his support . . . the Constitution would 
never have been adopted.”140 Similarly, for James Beck, it was Washington 
who convinced Americans that a new constitution was needed: “Turning his 
back upon the sweet retirement of Mount Vernon,” “[o]nce again the father of 
his people came to their rescue.”141 For lawyers today, this focus on 
Washington may come as a surprise, because the present-day legal community 
most associates the text with James Madison or perhaps Alexander 
Hamilton142—and indeed both received their fair share of plaudits as well. But 
Warren, Beck, and other constitutional advocates, by emphasizing Washington, 
responded to a nagging criticism from constitutional skeptics—namely the idea 
that the revolutionary experience (complete with the Declaration of 
Independence) was fundamentally distinct from the more suspect constitutional 
founding a decade later. Washington’s status as both wartime commander-in-
chief of the Continental Army and presiding “father” of the Convention 
allowed constitutionalists to refashion the text as the ultimate fulfillment of the 
revolutionary project. As such, it supported their efforts to confront directly the 
Populist and Progressive argument that the constitutional founding was a 
counterrevolutionary act. Glorifying Washington as a transcendent figure recast 
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the meaning of the Constitution and quelled suspicion of its revolutionary 
credentials. 
Such glorification of all the Framers also served another equally central 
purpose. It responded to a public discourse shaped by intellectuals such as 
Charles Beard that, according to Warren, explained constitutional motivations 
in terms of petty rivalries and material interests and, in the process, demeaned 
the heroism of the nation’s “fathers.” During one of the many university 
lectures established to honor the text, the Cutler Lecture at Rochester 
University, Warren declared, “To describe the Constitution as simply the 
product of class interests or of propertied selfishness, is to assert that such 
motives as patriotism, pride in country, unselfish devotion to the public 
welfare, and belief in fundamental principles of right and government, did not 
exist or control.”143 These views besmirched true statesmen, and, even worse, 
made Americans in the twentieth century believe that they could do better. 
Reminding citizens of the gulf between the incorruptible Framers on the one 
hand and contemporary politicians and agitators on the other hand, he 
remarked, “They were great men, employed upon a great task, and moved by 
high impulses . . . . When you are asked, hereafter, to consider amendments to 
that instrument, it would be well to consider carefully whether the men who 
urge such changes are equally great and whether their motives and ideals are 
equally high.”144 
Taken as a whole, the educational campaign, with its focus on producing 
deference through ideological uniformity, duty, and reverence for the Founders, 
envisioned a particularly hierarchical relationship between the citizen and 
constitutional government. More than anything else, proponents of the text 
sought to transform the ordinary American’s encounter with the document and 
its institutions. The Constitution was to be understood not as one historical path 
out of many, but rather as a sacred inheritance from mythic Founders—
fundamentally outside the bounds of legitimate opposition and to be preserved 
at all costs. 
Perhaps nothing better underscored these interrelated educational goals 
than the project to erect the new Supreme Court building. Completed in 1935, 
it represented pro-Constitution activism’s greatest and most lasting aesthetic 
creation during the era, powerfully dramatizing the emerging vision of the ties 
binding citizens to their governing text. Cass Gilbert, a well-known architect 
with close links to the American Legion, the American Defense Society, and 
the National Security League, was tasked with designing the building. During 
the war, Gilbert had played a notable role in government propaganda as the 
Associate Chairman of the Committee on Public Information’s Division of 
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Pictorial Publicity.145 Gilbert sought to make the building an imposing historic 
monument to the Constitution, one that would both inspire awe in citizens and 
melt away suspicion of the Court. For architectural critics at the time, however, 
“[t]he authority it meant to convey was easily confused with 
authoritarianism.”146 This was because of how Gilbert imagined the individual 
citizen’s aesthetic experience on viewing and entering the building. He hoped 
to overwhelm the individual with the majesty of the Court, and in the process, 
instill an emotional willingness within the citizen to subsume his or her identity 
into a deep attachment toward both the Court and the constitutional state it 
embodied. At the time, Gilbert was deeply influenced by the revival of classical 
Roman iconography and design in 1920s Italy.147 An admirer of Benito 
Mussolini, Gilbert chose an idealized and grand variation on ancient Roman 
architecture as the basis for the new building, sent Mussolini photographs of 
his Supreme Court drawings,148 and even traveled to Italy to visit Mussolini 
and handpick the Italian marble.149 
While clearly not all defenders of the Constitution during the period were 
sympathetic to Il Duce,150 Gilbert’s design and intentions for the building were 
in line with the broader civic culture that such groups promoted. The building 
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spoke to a pro-Constitution sensibility that saw deference to institutions and to 
heroic leaders as foundational for constructing a constitutionally loyal citizen 
supportive of broader national security goals. Although today’s discussions of 
constitutional commitment tend to link textual loyalty to self-examination 
instead of political compliance, such subservience nonetheless played an 
essential role at a moment when first-order disagreement about the document 
was a powerful force in public life. Under such conditions, constitutional 
education, through speeches, mass celebrations, textbooks, and even 
architectural monuments, tied the text to hierarchical forms of allegiance. 
B. American Exceptionalism and Cultural Particularity 
This politics of deference went hand in hand with an ethnicized discourse 
of collective identity, one that again asserted the importance of national 
security. Rather than avoiding the pitfalls of locating community in blood and 
land, pro-Constitution narratives of American exceptionalism played 
fundamentally on tropes about cultural particularity and fitness. On first glance, 
this might be surprising given how, as discussed previously, emerging accounts 
during the period regarding the specialness of the American Constitution 
invoked universalistic Enlightenment values. And indeed, important figures 
during and after World War I very consciously maintained that “Americanism” 
was not reducible to ethnic criteria. David Jayne Hill himself declared: 
It cannot be maintained that Americanism . . . is a matter of race. Our 
country from the beginning has been populated by people of widely 
different ethnic origins. Some of their qualities are perpetuated with 
practically little effacement, others are obscured by the syncretism of 
races; but there is no definable ethnic type that is exclusively entitled 
to be called American.151 
For many defenders of the Constitution at the time, the idea that collective 
identity was bound to affective attachment to a document—moreover, one that 
consisted of abstract republican principles—spoke to an inclusive brand of 
belonging. As Hill suggested, anyone—as long as he or she was willing to 
ascribe to these tenets—could become “American.”152 
However, ideas of cultural particularity steadily regained prominence as 
pro-war constitutionalists responded to yet another challenge emerging at the 
time: Why should one view the text as the best expression of a broader 
Enlightenment heritage that was not necessarily specific to the United States? 
Especially with growing numbers of new European immigrants, why not learn 
from these communities’ alternative methods for adapting the republican 
values of self-government, rights protection, and economic independence to 
changed modern circumstances? Indeed, immigrant groups played a powerful 
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role during the era in revitalizing political activism153 and speaking out against 
American involvement in World War I, especially within the labor movement 
and growing socialist parties.154 As anti-war and pro-immigrant voices like 
Randolph Bourne argued, the United States had the opportunity to become “the 
first international nation.”155 This meant incorporating new concepts from 
abroad and even fundamentally shifting existing institutions rather than simply 
holding firm to a “homogeneous Americanism,”156 especially when such 
ideologies went hand in hand with militarism and coercive government 
practices. 
In order for defenders of the Constitution to link textual loyalty to national 
security, and then to the war effort, they would first have to explain why the 
constitutional structure should remain immune from fundamental revision. Hill 
and others responded to this challenge by focusing again on American 
exceptionalism. The historical uniqueness of the American experience not only 
suggested that the Constitution was a sacred document and could not simply be 
replaced, but also that there was something culturally distinctive about the 
North American colonies that allowed such creedal values to flourish in the 
first place. The Framers were able to devise the Constitution because they had 
been raised in a political community culturally attuned to practices of self-rule 
and principles of liberty. According to Hill, the earliest colonists left 
monarchical England because of a “protest against mere power,”157 and indeed 
the first truly American charter of liberty was not the Constitution but the 
Mayflower Compact of November 11, 1620. Long before England’s 1647 
“Agreement of the People” or the later writings of Locke and Rousseau, initial 
settlers—”a company of plain men, sailing over wintry seas to an unknown 
land with the purpose of escaping the too heavy hand of an absolute 
government”158—forged “the beginning of real self-government.”159 
Thus, the Constitution, a century and a half later, was just the culmination 
of a specifically American cultural commitment to the “voluntary renunciation 
of arbitrary power.”160 This commitment, once more, highlighted why the 
United States enjoyed a special and redemptive global project, embodied by the 
war effort, and emphasized the domestic importance of preserving the 
country’s distinctive constitutional heritage. Such facts were a reminder to U.S. 
citizens to be wary of new, destructive concepts—threats to American security 
and identity—brought to the country by immigrants that did not have the same 
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long-standing education in self-rule. As Burton Alva Konkle, a Swarthmore 
College history professor and frequent contributor to Constitutional Review in 
the 1920s, wrote of these recent arrivals, “instead of coming in a profound 
thoughtfulness for the blessings of free institutions, some place their raw 
Utopian theories on their banners and ask us to adopt them.”161 In order for the 
Constitution to be sustained, Hill similarly concluded that immigrants would 
have to shed their old world and “un-American” “ideas and sentiments.”162 A 
process of “Americanization”163 was required to make sure that a culture of 
constitutional commitment spread successfully, “‘assimilating’ the new 
elements that enter into our population.”164 
These voices saw the centerpiece of assimilation efforts as the stamping 
out of foreign languages in American educational and political life, with the 
expectation that an exclusive focus on English would help to standardize 
national identity and promote the capacities for self-rule among new 
communities. Calls for English-only measures expanded dramatically during 
the war as national security enmity focused especially on the German language, 
associated with both the Kaiser and revolutionary socialism. Hill’s American 
Defense Society demanded that state and local governments eliminate the use 
of German in schools and fight to make “the German language . . . a dead 
language.”165 At the same time, the NSL began a national campaign “with the 
object of destroying the German-language press,”166 through mass popular 
rallies and pressure on advertisers and news dealers.167 
When the war ended, English-only proposals grew beyond the focus on 
German identity. By 1923, the number of states that required English-only 
instruction stood at thirty-five, up from just nine at the end of the nineteenth 
century.168 Capturing the “Americanization” sentiment in 1919, Albert 
Bushnell Hart, Harvard historian and NSL Education Director of the 
Committee on Patriotism through Education, remarked that “[a]ny adult 
immigrant who comes to this country and is found three years thereafter unable 
to use English for the ordinary communications of life should be 
repatriated.”169 In his view, “[n]o public or private schools ought to be allowed 
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to educate in any racial language except English” and suffrage should be 
limited solely to “those who can read and write English, not merely a few stock 
phrases and sign their name, but can actually communicate with people in the 
ordinary daily life.”170 
This slippage between the text’s universalism and the culturally particular 
nature of American greatness promoted a xenophobic politics that intertwined 
national security and constitutional loyalty. Figures like David Jayne Hill or 
Albert Bushnell Hart, who had been W.E.B. Du Bois’s professor at Harvard 
and served as trustee of Howard University,171 may have believed in the 
theoretical fitness of all ethnic and racial groups for full American membership. 
But transforming this theoretical fitness into a reality entailed eliminating 
cultural multiplicity and employing government power to impose a standard 
“American” identity on all groups. It meant pursuing at home the same brand 
of “tutelage” for racial and ethnic communities in their “political childhood” as 
that employed abroad to quell insurrection in the Philippines and elsewhere. 
Even more troubling, as threatened communities contested these policies, 
the Constitution’s defenders often fell back on explicitly racialized 
explanations for internal resistance and for why security requirements justified 
the exclusion in practice of some groups. Although Hill’s discussion of the 
Pilgrims left the point essentially implicit, Iowa Governor Shaw reminded 
Americans that the social environment that produced the Constitution was 
above all an Anglo-Protestant one. In his view the reason why 
“Americanization” projects, and indeed the Constitution itself, faced such 
opposition was that by the early twentieth century the Anglo-Protestant identity 
was disintegrating under the pressure of racial and ethnic heterogeneity. From 
African Americans to Roman Catholics, the United States found itself 
attempting to integrate increasingly diverse communities; “many of them,” 
Shaw argued, were “biologically unable to think in terms of Anglican [sic] 
liberty.”172 For the editors of The American Standard, the Klan’s widely 
circulated journal,173 the Constitution “put into written form the immortal 
principles of liberty, popular government, and equal justice, which were the 
fruitage of Anglo-Saxon character.”174 In language that echoed Hill’s more 
secularized account, the constitutional text was a fundamentally Protestant 
document that fulfilled the ambitions of the earlier Mayflower Compact, and 
which “made us a Body Politic, in the name of God.”175 For the editors, the 
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country had to remain true to these racial and religious origins or it was liable 
to perish.176 
In the end, the manner in which constitutionalists during the period moved 
between universalistic principles and culturally particular historical arguments 
highlights a significant danger with the connection between constitutional 
loyalty and national security. If anything, the link in the 1910s and 1920s 
between the Constitution and American exceptionalism meant that the 
document operated in collective life as a powerful rhetorical tool reimagining 
ethno-cultural homogeneity and control as national security requirements. Pro-
war and pro-Constitution forces were able to combine seemingly conflicting 
political ideas about universalism and cultural superiority precisely through a 
constitutional reverence that promoted a discourse of American chosen-ness. 
This combination allowed civic and government actors to assert universalistic 
and inclusive commitments in theory, while in practice arguing that national 
security and basic order required the imposition of coercive policies grounded 
in ethnic and racial differences. Indeed, a seemingly paradoxical but lasting 
legacy of pro-Constitution activism in the period was the construction of a 
sophisticated language of racial domination that could draw on security 
concerns for validation while still speaking in universalistic terms. 
C. Repression and the Constitution’s Friends and Enemies 
Yet another deeply troubling feature of the debate over the Constitution 
involved the defenders’ emphasis on government repression. Pro-Constitution 
forces often repeated that the vast majority of citizens and new immigrants 
were “well-meaning people”177 who could be made patriotic through popular 
education about the text. At the same time, however, there existed a small 
group of enemies to the Constitution who could never be persuaded. According 
to one wartime National Security League pamphlet, these enemies were often 
“Secret Americans,” individuals that might not have explicitly admitted their 
support for the German cause or for Russian revolutionaries but who quietly 
stood behind arguments about pacifism or the evils of militarism to undermine 
the constitutional system.178 The pamphlet continues, “The only safe rule is to 
regard all of these as unconditional traitors.”179 As the pages of Constitutional 
Review maintained, such individuals underscored how “the enemy [was] within 
our gates,”180 “covertly at work to undermine the Constitution.”181 Indeed, this 
internal threat, spearheaded by foreign agitators or revolutionary extremists, 
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had “made great headway”182 and had “become[] a focus of infection for 
others.”183 
As a result, education and Americanization efforts alone were not enough; 
groups also appealed directly to all friends of the Constitution to defend the 
political community by actively suppressing dissent. These groups argued not 
only for a dramatically expanded domestic security apparatus, but even for 
citizens to take matters into their own hands as part of a broader surveillance 
climate. The American Defense Society demanded “increased vigor in the 
interning of aggressive pro-German sympathizers, whether German citizens or 
not.”184 Arguing for the country to follow the lead of England’s mass German 
internment, the Society noted that after the arrests, “malicious plots and 
propaganda ceased.”185 It further called for the exclusion of the Socialist Party 
of America from politics—a position that met with some success as Wisconsin 
socialist Victor Berger was twice elected to Congress in 1918 and 1919 but 
denied his seat by the House.186 Similarly, in 1920 the New York State 
Assembly suspended and then expelled on ideological grounds five socialists 
who had been elected to the body.187  In fact, strong constitutionalists 
frequently claimed that the Wilson Administration, notorious during the period 
for its harsh crackdown on dissent,188 was actually doing too little to stamp out 
internal threats. George Sutherland, former Utah Senator, future Supreme Court 
Justice, and himself a contributor to Constitutional Review, declared in 1918 
that existing measures “did not go far enough.”189 In his view, during wartime 
there was no place for “scurrilous and abusive criticisms of our form of 
government, our Constitution and our institutions” because “an unbridled 
tongue may be as dangerous as a wicked hand.”190 
One famous voice of criticism came from within the Administration itself. 
Charles Warren, in many ways the most respected intellectual face of pro-
Constitution activism in the 1920s and a well-connected figure in the 
Democratic Party,191 played an especially aggressive role in debates within the 
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Justice Department. While Assistant Attorney General, Warren was the 
principal drafter of Wilson’s two 1917 Proclamations regulating the conduct of 
“alien enemies,” not to mention the Espionage Act (1917),192 the Trading with 
the Enemy Act (1917),193 and the Sedition Act (1918).194 These laws provided 
the legal infrastructure for a massive and historically unparalleled federal 
assault on speech, dissent, and immigrant rights. Among other things, they led 
to the first government censorship boards,195 the outlaw, according to historian 
Robert Goldstein, of “virtually all criticism of the war or the government,”196 
and the summary arrest of “alien enemies”197 (alongside other measures to 
control enemy nationals such as their mass registration and a complete ban on 
their entering Washington, D.C.).198 To give a sense of the coerciveness of 
national security practices during the war, some two thousand people were 
prosecuted under the Espionage and Sedition Acts, mostly for speech crimes 
(well-known politicians included socialists Eugene V. Debs199 and Victor 
Berger200). Over six thousand “alien enemies” were detained under presidential 
warrants that the Attorney General issued, and the vast majority of them were 
interned in army detention camps.201 
Warren saw the writing of these bills as his greatest achievement while in 
office.202 But he was nonetheless angered by what he viewed as the weakness 
of the Justice Department in combating seditious speech. In particular, he 
believed that existing treason laws should be more “vigorously enforced,”203 
ensuring that all U.S. civilians who gave “aid or comfort”204 to the enemy—
through, for example, nonviolent political advocacy of anti-war positions—
were fully prosecuted. As for noncitizen civilians, they should face court 
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martial for analogous crimes.205 When these views met with some internal 
resistance and it became clear that the Justice Department was skeptical of 
mass treason trials, he reached out to extreme pro-war Senators like Lee Slater 
Overman from North Carolina and George Earle Chamberlain from Oregon. 
Warren drafted a new bill providing for the military trial of civilian citizens and 
noncitizens alike of all speech crimes,206 with punishment by death at the 
discretion of military judges.207 As Warren told Overman, in his view the lack 
of vigilance in the Justice Department had made clear that military involvement 
was the only solution: “[F]or nearly a year I have been convinced that the only 
effective way of dealing with enemy activities in this country was by the 
military . . . . I do not believe that war can be effectively carried on by the 
criminal courts.”208 After Chamberlain introduced the bill in the Senate, 
Thomas Gregory, the Attorney General, was furious at Warren’s 
insubordination and forced him to resign. Warren’s actions however made him 
a cause célèbre in Washington among national security hawks and helped to 
burnish further the patriotic credentials of pro-Constitution forces.209 
Such activists did not stop with calls for new, more coercive security 
measures; they also pursued separate non-governmental actions against 
constitutional enemies. As one famous wartime manifesto, widely circulated by 
the National Security League, declared: 
We ask that good Americans . . . uphold the hands of the Government 
at every point . . . . Furthermore, we ask that where governmental 
action cannot be taken, they arouse an effective and indignant public 
opinion against the enemies of our country, whether these enemies 
masquerade as pacifists, or proclaim themselves the enemies of our 
Allies, or act through organizations such as the I.W.W. and the 
Socialist party machine, or appear nakedly as the champions of 
Germany.210 
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This militant constitutionalism,211 in which defenses of the text required 
popular campaigns of social censure, civic participation in government 
crackdowns, and if need be, independent political violence, became part of the 
public culture of the era. Bar associations routinely imposed “punitive 
professional sanctions”212 like disbarment for those lawyers who defended or 
associated with dissidents; and constitutional loyalty meant “cleansing the bar,” 
as historian Jerold Auerbach notes.213 At universities, professors who took anti-
war stances or who were viewed as otherwise ideologically suspect found 
themselves without employment. At Columbia University, President Nicholas 
Murray Butler, an outspoken pro-Constitution voice, stated that there would be 
“no place” at the university for those who countenanced “treason” and oversaw 
the firing of numerous academics—eventually leading Charles Beard to resign 
in protest.214 
Patriotic speaking tours, such as those of Robert McNutt McElroy, 
Princeton professor and NSL Educational Director, also embodied this militant 
spirit. As McElroy told the New York Tribune after a preparedness trip to 
Wisconsin, the whole state was effectively committing treason, given its large 
German population and “100,000 disloyal votes”215 for socialist candidates. 
Stating the need for government investigations and, if necessary, action from 
loyal Americans, he declared, “I was out there when the news of the German 
advance was coming through, and from the reception it got you would scarcely 
have gained the impression that it was a blow to America. You would have 
been far more likely to suppose that it was somehow a cause for congratulation 
in this country.”216 These cries of treason and calls for action stirred various 
groups to respond. The most notorious of them was the American Protective 
League, which, during the war, enjoyed a quasi-official status as it raided and 
surveilled suspected German sympathizers with the backing of state and federal 
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authorities. Similarly, the American Legion, again with government 
complicity,217 initiated violent attacks on those it deemed constitutional 
enemies, including socialists and radical unions like the International Workers 
of the World (I.W.W.). As Progressive journalist Norman Hapgood reported at 
the time, by the end of 1920 the American Civil Liberties Union had verified 
over fifty coordinated acts of violence nationwide by Legionnaires.218 
In effect, pro-Constitution advocacy became closely intertwined with a 
remarkably authoritarian statecraft. Precisely because constitutional enemies 
could not be educated or reasoned with, government officials and civic 
associations argued for legal and political responses that made use of the 
emerging national security infrastructure. Defending everything from bans on 
political parties to speech restrictions, arrests, and deportations, such voices 
maintained that anti-Constitution sentiment had to be eliminated once and for 
all. Again, most tellingly, this militancy was justified precisely in terms of the 
Constitution; security vigilance ensured the survival of the constitutional state 
and with it a liberal republican political order. Thus, organized groups 
defended constitutional reverence on national security grounds, and saw the 
exercise of repressive power as a method of fostering popular identification 
with the text. 
Ultimately, this period of militant constitutionalism had profound and 
reverberating effects on American public culture. In particular, the concerted 
civic and government campaign succeeded in placing anti-constitutional 
sentiment on the permanent defensive. In the years that followed the war, an 
accusation of constitutional opposition was often tantamount to a charge of 
disloyalty. This did not mean that constitutional skepticism disappeared from 
the public realm. Indeed, it remained especially strong among Progressive-
influenced intellectuals219 as well as radical voices on the political left.220 Both 
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groups, against the backdrop of the Great Depression and judicial opposition to 
the New Deal, expressed with renewed vigor longstanding structural concerns 
about the anti-democratic characteristics of the Constitution. But such views 
did not resonate as broadly, even prior to judicial acceptance of the New Deal, 
as they had twenty years ago. In the interim, public perceptions had begun to 
shift as to the relationship between Americanism, constitutional devotion, and 
national loyalty. For example, by the 1930s, even the Communist Party hoped 
to burnish its patriotic credentials by embracing a politics of constitutional 
reverence. During the 1936 elections, Earl Browder, Executive Secretary of the 
Communist Party, went out of his way to convince constituencies of the 
ideological continuities between communism and American constitutionalism. 
The key framer of the Party’s 1936 platform, which famously stated 
“Communism is Twentieth-century Americanism,”221 he stumped across the 
country carrying a copy of the Constitution in his pocket, a document meant to 
symbolize his “rights as a citizen.”222 Given the emerging mainstream public 
imagination, for a group concerned with being viewed as foreign or un-
American, there was now no better way to prove one’s local authenticity than 
to engage in Constitution worship. 
In many ways, Americans today live on the other side of a long historical 
process of constitutional elevation that began during World War I. The 
implications of such national security origins for our contemporary climate of 
constitutional commitment are hardly reassuring. They highlight how the 
modern genesis of widespread attachment to the document was shaped 
fundamentally by markedly illiberal wartime and postwar practices. Such 
practices leaned heavily on ideological deference, forced assimilation, 
militarism, and repression, and sought to reimagine an aggressive security 
infrastructure as essential to the protection of American values. Moreover, 
these practices not only helped to quell first-order disagreements about 
constitutional legitimacy. They also established many of the central arguments 
that have dominated more recent American political thinking about the 
interconnections between the Constitution, global responsibility, and domestic 
security. Thus, in the following conclusion, I suggest that the problem with 
these World War I origins is not simply that of a dark past that offers little to 
say about today’s constitutional climate. Rather, the scripts developed nearly a 
century ago continue to intertwine constitutional attachment with the 
prerogatives of the national security state in ways that often go unnoticed, 
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emphasizing the real difficulties of separating the liberal and illiberal 
dimensions of American constitutional culture. 
CONCLUSION: THE TROUBLED LIBERALISM OF AMERICAN  
CONSTITUTIONAL LIFE 
In this Article, I have challenged the prevailing conventional wisdom that 
American constitutionalism has operated over the long run to refashion 
political and civic life around liberal values of pluralism, self-reflection, and 
rights-protection—in particular by curbing coercive national security 
frameworks. Through a close examination of the mass politics of constitutional 
veneration during and after World War I, I highlighted instead how discourses 
of security and constitutional commitment actually developed together, 
critically reinforcing one another at a moment of shared genesis. Present-day 
constitutionalists, particularly within left-leaning legal academic circles, 
probably would be at pains to distinguish their own inclusive and civil 
libertarian goals—not to mention the current constitutional culture—from this 
earlier era of militant constitutionalism. But as I indicate, there is a profound 
symbiotic relationship between today’s “good” liberal constitutionalists and the 
“bad” illiberal constitutionalists of the early twentieth century. 
Laurence Tribe, Geoffrey Stone, and others may well see very little in 
common between the pro-security constitutional discourses of World War I and 
their own vision of the text as the focal point for a public culture of dissent and 
self-critique. Yet, in a deep sense, such scholars valorize a public culture that 
exists against a backdrop of remarkable political consensus around the 
legitimacy of the basic institutions of the federal government. Unlike a century 
ago, no relevant organized political constituencies today question the essential 
structure of the constitutional state—if we should have a presidential system, or 
two houses of Congress, or a Supreme Court, let alone whether there should be 
a broad civilian defense infrastructure housed in the executive branch operative 
during peacetime. By contrast, none of these elements were taken for granted in 
the lead up to American participation in World War I; organized citizens 
contested everything from the tri-partite division of federal power to the 
appropriateness of a standing army. This widespread first-order disagreement 
raised profound anxieties among central political and economic elites about 
whether the country was in fact unraveling under the strain of industrial 
conflict, heightened immigration, and Europe’s increasingly destructive 
imperial rivalries. Through an organized campaign of constitutional veneration, 
such elites in effect buttressed an economic and political status quo in real 
peril. 
Indeed, one might well argue that the relative openness of the prevailing 
constitutional discourse today is tied closely to the fact that these first-order 
questions of legitimacy have been settled. All politically relevant groups—from 
Tea Party activists on the right to Occupy Wall Street protestors on the left—
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essentially assume the permanence of American legal and political structures. 
In essence, Tribe and Stone are now able to focus on the self-reflective nature 
of constitutional discourse, and its embedded spaces for dissent, precisely 
because the parameters of acceptable popular disagreement have already been 
established—the meaning and extent of dissent have been fundamentally 
tamed. This does not imply that current defenders of the Constitution are 
simply wrong when they highlight how the governing constitutional culture 
facilitates reform efforts or presses against the very worst excesses of 
government violence. It does, however, underscore that today’s presumptively 
liberal constitutional politics resulted from the practical elimination—often 
through force—of more revolutionary alternatives. This fact alone makes it 
very difficult to keep the constitutional culture embraced by left-leaning 
academics uncontaminated by and distinct from its illiberal foundations. 
Perhaps one way to underscore this point is by highlighting the role of 
World War I era practices in ushering in a fundamental shift in how the 
Constitution has been debated and conceived. In the late nineteenth century, the 
Constitution was primarily depicted as simply a governing framework—a 
decision-making process and legal infrastructure shaping the contours of 
legislative, judicial, and executive authority. In this way, it was akin to other 
good and bad governing frameworks across the globe. And for various 
constituencies (especially labor activists and middle class reformers), the 
structures that the Constitution established were increasingly inadequate to 
meet basic social ends. 
Within this broader discussion about how the structures of the state should 
be organized, much of the World War I era campaign of constitutional 
veneration deemphasized the focus on the actual empirical functioning and 
effects of the existing institutions. Pro-Constitution voices sought to remove 
basic structural questions from active contestation by instead reorienting 
constitutional conversation around the document’s role as an ethical symbol of 
an overarching national project, one committed to universal values and 
requiring global preeminence. In many ways, today’s liberal defenders of 
constitutional veneration carry on this basic shift in emphasis. To the extent 
that they present the Constitution as a “practice” or a culture of self-reflection 
and critique instead of as a relatively fixed structural framework, the result is to 
obscure precisely the extent to which foundational questions of institutional 
design have been removed from the table. 
Just as important, the national security origins of today’s constitutional 
climate also speak to lasting—if under-acknowledged—ideological continuities 
between the liberal egalitarian and the repressive dimensions in the American 
constitutional experience. This is perhaps most apparent in the two ways that 
the exceptionalist rhetoric of our constitutional culture has been put to use in 
the years since World War I. For instance, during the Civil Rights era, such 
exceptionalism played a central ideological role in justifying policies of 
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desegregation and racial inclusion. But at the same time, it also intertwined 
those reform aims with a set of Cold War foreign policy objectives grounded in 
an expanded domestic security infrastructure. 
One sees this linkage between reform aims and Cold War foreign policy 
quite clearly in sociologist Gunnar Myrdal’s seminal 1944 study on race 
relations in the United States, American Dilemma, a formative text for mid-
twentieth century political elites. There, Myrdal contended that the Constitution 
embodied what he called “the American creed”223 and through the text “[t]his 
nation early laid down as the moral basis for its existence the principles of 
equality and liberty.”224 Myrdal’s invocation of America’s universalist national 
identity accepted the practical reality of injustice, particularly the sinfulness of 
slavery, but essentially viewed the United States as an incomplete liberal 
society. For Myrdal, although the United States had only partially achieved its 
ideals, “[t]he main trend in [American] history is the gradual realization of the 
American Creed.”225 In his view, the effort to end segregation in the South was 
ultimately about fulfilling civic goals embedded in the Constitution—a position 
that many white liberals and middle-class African Americans came to embrace 
in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, Martin Luther King, Jr. famously invoked the 
abstract principles of the Constitution to describe the American project in terms 
of universal equality and the country in 1964 as “essentially a dream, a dream 
as yet unfulfilled.”226 
But, as powerful as this exceptionalist discourse was for liberalizing 
reform, it also leveraged such reform for clear national security ends. Myrdal, 
along with many Cold War political elites influenced by American Dilemma, 
contended that since the country was where the Enlightenment took historical 
root—as embodied by the Constitution—this meant that “America feels itself 
to be humanity in miniature.”227 The consequence was that just as, 
domestically, the United States was a nation open to all, internationally, 
American power stood “warmheartedly against oppression in all the world.”228 
Given that the country’s constitutional values expressed the global 
community’s ideals, American interventionism—and the massive peacetime 
civilian defense framework that maintained it—necessarily involved a defense 
of liberal goals against illiberal threats. In this way, invocations of the United 
States’ exceptional constitutional culture served, as scholar Nikhil Pal Singh 
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remarks, to “uph[o]ld the prerogatives of the American national security 
state,”229 including domestic efforts to root out constitutional enemies during 
the Cold War. 
One may well argue that the same leveraging of exceptionalist discourse 
and constitutional attachment for national security frameworks has been a 
staple of the post-September 11 “War on Terror.” In effect, political elites at 
key moments over the last century have repeatedly—and at times 
unwittingly—reproduced precisely the constitutional vision articulated by pro-
security voices in the 1910s and 1920s, especially that of David Jayne Hill and 
Albert Bushnell Hart. Recall that, for Hill and Hart, American belonging was 
grounded in universal Enlightenment values, as defined by constitutional 
commitment alone rather than racial or ethnic criteria. But as a corollary, they 
maintained that such exceptionalism, symbolized by the Constitution, 
necessitated an aggressive security approach capable of projecting American 
power and of safeguarding the constitutional state from all perceived threats. 
All of this indicates that the most salutary readings of the American 
constitutional culture’s contemporary role require an important caveat. It may 
be the case that over the course of the twentieth century the rise of 
constitutional commitment has made it less likely for government actors to 
engage in the same rights violations as those that marked earlier eras—as 
Stone, Pildes, and others would argue. For instance, today, the idea of mass 
racial internment such as occurred during World War II would be unthinkable 
in large part because of our constitutional culture. But at the same time, one can 
also read the post-World War I experience as that of a near continuous growth 
in the footprint of the security apparatus, punctuated by repeated failures in 
rights protection down to the present-day. Moreover, in a deep sense, both the 
expansion of the security state and the persistent breakdown in basic safeguards 
have been shaped by a public culture that ties aggressive interventionism 
abroad and security practices at home to the very protection and promotion of 
American values, with the Constitution at the core. In this way, the politics of 
constitutional veneration has operated on both sides of the ledger. It has helped 
to shape a political context that on the one hand curbs the most extreme 
violations, while on the other hand promotes a vision of American international 
police power that systematically justifies on security grounds rights 
infringement in the first place. 
Thus, the lasting influence of World War I era constitutional discourse 
underscores both the strengths and significant pitfalls of the constitutional 
culture produced during that period. It highlights the ideological 
interconnections between those rights-inclusive elements of the constitutional 
culture that scholars valorize and the potentially repressive strains that they 
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deemphasize in public conversation. In particular, these ties bring home the 
fact that one cannot write off the repressive strains as simply aberrational 
features of an essentially liberal modern constitutional tradition. As this Article 
has explored, the Constitution—and especially the climate of veneration that 
surrounds it—has provided twentieth-century Americans with the ideological 
parameters for political debate. Although these parameters have no doubt 
established a basis for important and truly radical changes, they have also left 
the country with a much more troubled cultural inheritance than many scholars 
and citizens appreciate or desire. In the long run, reckoning with this 
inheritance will require an understanding of the tangled relationship in 
American constitutional discourse between liberalism and illiberalism, and of 
the coercive outcomes that have been facilitated by presumptively liberal and 
inclusive constitutional values. 
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